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ELIMINATING ARCHAIC FEATURES OF EXECUTION
PROCESS IN PENNSYLVANIA.
For a commercial community it is of great importance
that the legal machinery for collecting debts should be both just
and swift. The increased recognition of this fact in the past few
years has had its effect in Pennsylvania as elsewhere. In i911,
the General Assembly established a municipal court in Alle-
gheny County, and in 1913 a similar court in. Philadelphia, in
order to relieve the congestion of business in those counties. The
new rules of court promulgated by the Courts of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia County in 19x3 show the effect of this general
feeling. Perhaps the most marked change is the great reduction
in the length of time required to reach trial in Philadelphia
County. Commercial cases may now be tried in the Common
Pleas within six months from the time of ordering on the trial
list; in the Municipal Court, the time is from two to three weeks.
But all this expedition in arriving at a judgment is of little
worth unless proper means are supplied for enforcing the pay-
ment of the judgment. The Legislature provided unsatisfied
judgment creditors with a much needed weapon by the Act of
May 9, 1913,1 which provided for the oral examination of judg-
ment debtors before the court. But there still exist anachron-
isms which hinder or delay the creditor to whom money is
justly due. It is the province of this article to point out three of
these undesirable features of our statute law.
I. INQUISITION UPON REAL ESTATE.
In the ordinary commercial case where the plaintiff has ob-
tained a judgment, he must, to enforce payment, sue out a writ
of fieri facias directing the sheriff that "of the goods and chat-
tels, lands and tenements of John Smith, defendant," he "cause
'P. L 197.
(652)
ELIMINATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA EXECUTIONS 653
to be levied" the amount of the judgment with interest and costs.
If the defendant has personal property the sheriff not only levies
on it in obedience to the writ, but proceeds to sell it, in order to
pay the plaintiff's judgment. If, however, it becomes necessary
to resort to the defendant's real estate, the sheriff levies on the
real estate and then, instead of selling it, proceeds to "summon
an inquest of six men, for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the rents and profits of such estate, beyond all reprises, will be
sufficient to satisfy within seven years the judgment on which
such execution was issued with the interest and costs of
suit."' 2 The purpose of this "inquiSition" is, of course, to give
the defendant a chance to save his land. If there is no condem-
nation, i. e., if the inquest find that the rents, etc., will pay-
the judgment in seven years, the defendant may, with the plain-
tiff's permission, continue to occupy the land so long as he makes
certain half-yearly payments on account of the debt. Or the
plaintiff may, at his option, have a writ of liberari facias by
virtue of which he obtains possession of the land and holds it till
he has taken the amount of his judgment out 9f the rents and
profits.
The history of this practice is interesting. In England,
before 1285, a judgment creditor might have a writ of leri facis
directing the sheriff to sell the goods of the debtor, or he might
have a writ of levari facias, directing the sheriff to seize the debt-
or's goods and receive the rents and profits of his lands, till the
debt was satisfied; but he had no means of subjecting the land it-
self to the payment of the debt, for such a remedy would have
undermined the feudal rights of the debtor's lord. In 1285 was
enacted the Statute of Westminster II, s creating a new writ
thereafter called an elegit, to which a judgment creditor was to be
entitled at his election. The writ of eleqit directed the sheriff to
deliver to the creditor "all the chattels of the debtor (saving only
his oxen and beasts of his plough) and the one-half of his land,
' Act of May io, 1881, §z, P. L x3, (Purdon's Digest, x563).
"13 Edw. L c. i&.
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until the debt be levied upon a reasonable price or extent." In ac-
cordance with this statute the defendant's goods and chattels were
not sold but were delivered to the plaintiff at an appraised value.
If this value was not sufficient to satisfy the debt the sheriff de-
livered to the plaintiff one-half of the defendant's freehold lands
to hold until the amount of the debt should be levied out of the
rents and profits.4 This is the system in force in England today,
save that by statute5 the sheriff is empowered to deliver to the
creditor all, instead of half of the debtor's lands.
In Pennsylvania, the first Assembly held at Upland (Ches-
ter) ratified "the laws agreed upon in England," which made all
lands and goods liable to pay debts, "except where there is legal
issue, and then all the goods and one-third of the land only."
Three days later, on December 7, 1682, in The Great Law, the
Assembly proceeded to change the law which related to execution
against lands by making one-half of the debtor's land, instead of
one-third, liable to execution where there was legal issue.7 By a
law passed May io, i688, appraisement by "twelve honest and
discreet men of. the neighborhood" was provided for,8 appar-
ently in case the land was to be handed over to the creditor in
whole or part payment of the debt.. This enactment survived
with some vicissitudes until 1705. All of these seventeenth cen-
tury statutes show the effect of feudal ideas by restricting the
amount of land liable to pay debts in cases where there was legal
issue.
In 1705 was passed the act9 from which our present practice
has arisen. That act provided for an inquest of twelve who
should decide whether the net profits of the land would pay the
debt in seven years. If they would, the sheriff was to deliver the
land to the plaintiff as on writs of clegit in England; if they
'See Blackstone's Commentaries, Book 3, P. 418.
'x and 2 VicL. c. 110 (1838).
'Duke of York's Laws, p. ioo.
'Duke of York's Laws. p. z2o.
* Duke of York's Laws. p. I8o.
ex DaIL 67.
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would not, the creditor was to be entitled to a writ of venditioni
exponas. This act and others amendatory of it, Were substan-
tially re-enacted on June 16, 1836.10 Since that date the law has
been changed in some parxticulars, but the backbone of it is still
the Act of 1705.
When personal property is taken in execution, the defend-
ant has no right under any circumstances to oblige the plaintiff
to accept payment by installments spread over a number of
years. If the judgment is not paid, the court, at the creditor's
request, directs the sheriff to sell the debtor's goods and to pay
the creditor's claim out of the proceeds, and there is an end of
the matter. That the situation should be different where real
estate is involved is due to the peculiar and almost superstitious-
regard of our ancestors for that species of property, and to their
strong feudal feeling that land should remain in one family as
long as possible. But why today distinguish a store-keeper's
stock-in-trade from the store in which he conducts his business?
His bread and butter come alike from both. If the peculiar pro-
tection given by law to all real estate were limited to a debtor's
dwelling-house, the principle would be more reasonable. But to
establish an arbitrary distinction between all personal property
and all real property is no longer either necessari or convenient,
since it merely serves to confer a chance benefit upon the fortu-
nate owner of land, and to impose a burden upon the creditor of
such an owner.
The application of this practice when life estates are
levied upon, is peculiarly valueless. A debtor's life estate is ordi-
narily levied upon, *condemned and sold just as in the case of
estates of inheritance, except in the rare instances in which a lien-
creditor asks f6r the appointment of a sequestrator. It is diffi-
cult to understand how the inquest can decide what an estate will
produce in seven years, when it may terminate in twenty-four
hours. And yet the present practice extends to life estates.11 The
P. L. 761, (Purdon's Digest, rx55 e: seq.)."
"Act of January 24, 1849, §§3 & 4, P. L. 677, (Purdpn's Digest, 1574);
Commonweatth v. Allen, ;3o Pa. 49 (1858); Moyer v. Caspr, 7 Pa. Dist. Rep.
7-V (1808).
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Commissioners on the Civil Code in reporting the Act of 1836
stated that they considered the then practice of selling life estates
on a fieri facias to be unfair to the debtor because it resulted in
selling at a sacrifice. They accordingly proposed the system of
sequestration which was adopted by the Legislature. In thirteen
years it was realized that life estates ought to be subject to sale
just as any other estate and Sections Three and Four of the Act
of January 24, I849,12 were passed accordingly.
A further and perhaps even stronger argument in favor of
changing the present system is to be found in the history of its
practical application. In Philadelphia County one inquest is
summoned in respect of all the real estate taken in execution in a
given month. The inquisition is purely perfunctory unless the
defendant wishes to produce testimony. The sheriff and the six
members of the inquest sign their names to'a printed form which
is returned with the writ, stating that the "rents, issues and
profits" of the property in question "are not of a clear yearly
value beyond all reprises, sufficient within the space of seven
years to satisfy the debt and damages in the writ aforesaid men-
tioned." One would suppose, if he were not familiar with our
system, that the sheriff could sell the property as soon as the in-
quest had performed this duty. But instead of this, he is bound
to make a return to the court, showing the condemnation, and
'the plaintiff must then sue out a writ of venditioni exponas
directing the sheriff to sell. Where the inquest by their finding
have shut off the defendant's hope of further delaying the plain-
tiff, why must the plaintiff resort to another writ in order to have
his remedy? Why is not one writ sufficient to cover the whole
situation?
That there should be but one writ directing the sheriff to
advertise and sell forthwith and dispensing with the formality
of an inquest, becomes apparent when we consider how regularly
condemnation is the result of inquisition. In Philadelphia
County an inquest has failed to condemn only once in the past
"P. L 677, (Pardon's Digest, 574).
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ten years. In Luzerne, Northumberland, Montgomery, Lehigh,
Delaware and Franklin Counties there has been no failure to
condemn for ten years past. In Berks, there have been two fail-
ures in eighteen years. In Allegheny County, the inquest fail to
condemn only three or four times a year. No writ of liberari
facias has been issued in any of these counties for many years,
so far as the writer can ascertain. On the rare occasions when
the inquest has failed to condemn, the plaintiff has allowed the.
defendant to retain possession of the land, and to pay the judg-
ment in half yearly installments. It does not seem wise or fair
that hundreds of judgment creditors should every year be put to
extra expense and delay in order to afford to a very few debtors
a relief to which they are really not entitled.
To abolish the inquest and permit immediate sale upon the
fieri facias (as is now the practice where inquisition has been
waived) would save four dollars and twenty-five cents in cash
and much time. Writs of fieri facias to sell real estate are now
returnable in Philadelphia County on the third Monday of Sep-
tember, and on the first Monday of each other month. A plain-
tiff, let us suppose, sued out a fieri facias on January 24, 1914,
the writ was returnable Monday, February 2, and a venditioni
exponas issued as late as February 5 was in time for the sale on
March 2. The plaintiff would have been saved money, but not
time, by the abolishment of the inquest and venditioni exponas,
since he was too late for the February sale and must have waited
till the March sale in any event, in order to give time for the
required advertising. But suppose the same plaintiff had been
unable to sue out his fieri facias until January 26 (January 25
was Sunday), it would then have been too late to have the writ
returnable Monday, February 2, because the statute requires five
days' notice of the inquisition to be given to the defendant. The
fieri facias would, therefore, have been returnable Monday,
March 2, and a sale could not have been had till April 6. Had
there been no inquisition and no necessity of issuing a venditioni
e.rponas the land would have been sold on March 2.
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The table contained in the note will show the saving of time
which the suggested change in procedure would bring about in
Philadelphia County.13
An examination of the statutes of the forty-eight states
shows that the Pennsylvania system is unique and that it is sur-
passed in efficiency by the systerris of most of our sister states.
In thirty-two states, including our neighbors, New York, New
Jersey and Maryland, land is sold upon the original writ after
proper advertisement. This method is simple, expeditious and
sensible. In eleven states the sale is preceded by an appraise-
ment, either to enable the plaintiff to take the land at its ap-
praised value1 4 or to establish a value two-thirds of which at
least must be bid in order to effect a sale.15 In Connecticut real
estate is not sold in execution but is "set out" to the judgment
creditor at an appraised value in whole or partial satisfaction of
his debt. In Virginia and West Virginia, the land may be taken
'FROM ISSUING EXECUTION TO SAL&
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in execution only by resorting to Chancery. The court will de-
cree a sale if it appears that the rents and profits of the land will
not pay the judgment in five years, otherwise the court will decree
a renting of the property till the judgment is paid. Whatevet
may be the defects of these systems they at least do not require
under all circumstances two writs for the sale of real estate. The
system in Delaware more nearly resembles our own than does
that of any other state. In that state there is an inquisition by
two freeholders, but only if the plaintiff demands it. If an inqui-
sition were held in Pennsylvania only on demand of the plaintiff,
the sheriff would seldom be called upon to summon an inquest.
It is time that our unique, and cumbersome system be dis-
carded, so that a judgment creditor whose judgment remains un-
satisfied, may forthwith procure his debtor's land to be sold with-
out the loss of valuable time and money.
II. JUDGMENT AGAINST THE MORTGAGOR IN A SCIRE FACIAS
SUR MORTGAGE.
When the oivner of mortgaged land defaults in the payment
of interest or principal, the mortgagee's common remedy is by a
writ of scire facias. By the Act of January 12, 1705,"6 it is pro-
vided that the writ of scire facias shall require the sheriff "to
make known to the mortgagor or mortgagors, his, her or their
heirs, executors or administrators, that he .or they be and appear
before the magistrates, judges, or justices of the said court or
courts, to show if anything he or they have to say, wherefore
the said mortgaged premises ought not to be seized and taken in
execution." Under this act it was decided that the owner of the
property need not be made a party defendant in the scire facias,7
and that two returns of nihil habet as to the mortgagor were
equivalent to a return of scire feci;18 so that mortgaged land
could be sold at sheriff's sale without actual notice of the sale
either to the mortgagor or to the owner. Under such circum-
stances, however, the owner A as not precluded by the judgment
:r Sin. 5%, §6, (Purdcni's Digec, 94).
"Mither v. Clark. I W'Vtts. 491 (18.33).
" Warder v. Tainter. 4 Watts, 27o (1835).
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from making any defense against the purchaser which he might
have had against the mortgagee,19 so that it was good practice to
make the owner a party defendant in the scire faias.
The Act of July 9, i9°I,20 and the Act of April 23, J903,21
which amended it, recognized the fact that the owner of the prop-
erty was the actual defendant in foreclosure proceedings and ac-
cordingly directed that he be made a party defendant in the scire
facias and ser ed by the sheriff. But the mortgagor or his heirs,
executors or administrators must still be served in the old-
fashioned way, i. e., either actually or by two returns of nihil habet.
Then, if neither mortgagor nor real owner have anything to say
wherefore the said mortgaged premises ought not to be seized, and
usually they have nothing to say, the plaintiff takes judgment
against each of them and sues out a writ of levari facias directing
the sheriff to sell the land.
Unless the mortgagor be also the real owner, a judgment
against him is obviously of no use as far as the mortgaged land
is concerned. The value of obtaining a judgment against the
mortgagor lies in the fact that it fixes the amount of damages as
against him, so that he will be precluded by the amount so fixed
upon a subsequent suit upon his bond. Thus, if the sale under
the foreclosure nets the plaintiff one thousand five hundred dol-
lars, out of a real debt of two thousand dollars, the damages in
the judgment upon the bond will be assessed at five hundred
dollars.
It will be observed that the mortgagor, with no notice of the
proceedings whatever, may be precluded with respect to the
amount of damages by a judgment obtained updn two returns of
nihil habet. Probably such a judgment or a subsequent judgment
upon the mortgagor's bond could be opened if the mortgagor had
a defense,22 so that they are not equivalent to judgments ob-
tained after actual service of process. But whether or not judg-
" Mather v. Clark, supra.
" P. L 6t4, §x, C. zo.
' P. L 261, §i, (Purdon's Digest, 240).
" See Warder v. Tainter, 4 Watts; o (1835); Green v. Plattsburg et at.,
13 Pa. C. C 339 (1893).
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ment in such a case can be opened upon showing that there is a
good defense and that there was no actual service of process, why
require the plaintiff to go through the formality. of obtaining two
returns of nihil habet? Why not allow him to enter judgment
against the mortgagor as an incident to entering judgment
against the real owner? The same effect is reached without the
use of purely formal and unavailing proceedings. Or better still,
why not dispense entirely with judgment against the mortgagor
in the foreclosure proceedings, and allow a judgment on the bond
to be opened if the mortgagor has a good defense?
The suggested change would assure to the mortgagor his
proper rights and Would in every case save labor for prothono-
tary, sheriff and attorney. It would often save the cost of issu-
ing an alias scire facias, seventy-five cents, and would always
save the cost of getting returns as to the mortgagor, which, wheni
there are two returns of nihil habet, is two dollars, and when the
mortgagor is actually served, may be more. Lastly it would often
save time.
Writs of scire facias are returnable in Philadelphia County,
which may be taken as a convenient example, on the first and
third Mondays of every month. Suppose that a scire facias sur
mortgage was issued on Saturday, February 14, 1914, return-
able on Monday, February i6 (the third Monday in February),
naming as defendants John Doe, mortgagor, deceased, and
Geoffrey Stiles, real owner. The sheriff served Stiles and handed
a copy of the writ to the person in actual possession of the land.
Finding no trace of Doe or of any of his heirs, executors or ad-
ministrators, he returned nihil lrabet as to him (or perhaps the
plaintiff simply directed him to make such a return.) The plaintiff
sued out an alias scire facias, returnable Monday, March
2, and this the sheriff also returned nihil habet as to John Doe,
mortgagor. On Saturday, March 7, the plaintiff was entitled to
judgment against Stiles for want of an affidavit of defense since
that was the third Saturday after the return day of the original
writ; but judgnent could not be taken against Doe for want of
an appearance until fourteen days after the return day of the
alias scire facias, i. e.,. March i7. A lez'ari fafias issued on
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March 17 missed the April sheriff's-sale and resulted in a sale of
the real estate on May 4.
Had it not been necessary in the above case to obtain two
returns of nilhil habet as to the mortgagor, the property would
have been sold in April instead of in May, as will be seen by the
following comparison:
Alias Judgment
Issue Return- return-" and levari Sale
scire facias able able facias
Present
practice .... February i4 February 16 March 2 March 17 May 4
Proposed
practice .... February 14 February x6 March 7 April 6
III. SUMMONS SUR GROUND RENT DEED.
The same general considerations apply to the suing out of
ground rents, and with additional force because of the consider-
able cost of advertising the alias writ. When the owner of
premises charged with a ground rent defaults in payment, the
owner of the ground rent usually enforces his rights by an action
of assunipsit. When it is remembered that the amount involved
is often less than two hundred dollars, the complicated procedure
seems a little too much for the occasion. In this proceeding, as in
the foreclosure of a mortgage, the plaintiff must obtain judgment
not only against the owner of the land, but against the original
covenantor, who has usually been dead for years past.
Take for example an imaginary case in Philadelphia
County. On Saturday, January 17, 1914, a summons sur ground
rent deed was issued, naming as defendants Robert Smith, orig-
inal covenantor, deceased, and William Jones, real owner. The
sheriff served Jones, handed a copy of the writ to the person in
actual possession of the land and returned nihil habet as to Smith.
The plaintiff was fortunate enough to get these returns made by
Tuesday, January 20, and thereupon sued out an alia. summons
returnable Monday, February 2. This alias summons was served
by the sheriff upon the person in possession of the premises and
advertised in the "Legal Intelligencer" and in one daily paper
once a week for two succes:ive weeks at a cost of twelve dollars.
The plaintiff could not take judgment against the original cove-
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nantor for want of an appearance until fourteen days after the
return day of the alias writ, that is, February 17. He sued out a
ficri facias returnable on the first Monday of March and after
condemnation by the inquest, sued out a venditioni exponas which
finally procured the sale of the property on April 6. The plaintiff
spent in this process seventy-nine days and about twenty-five dol-.
lars to recover a debt of probably less than two hundred dollars.
Had the deputy sheriff taken a little longer to serve the first writ
and made his return on January 21, instead of January 20, the
plaintiff would have lost another month's time; for in that case
his alias summons would have been returnable February 17,
judgment could have been entered March 4, the fleri facias
would have been returnable April 6 and the venditioni exponas
would have been returnable on May 4.
A judgment against the original covenantor is seldom of any
use whatever to the plaintiff, since the Supreme Court has de-
cided in Quain's Appeal,23 and again in W illiams's Appeal,
24
that the personal representatives of a deceased covenantor are
liable only for ground rent accrued up to the date of the cove-
nantor's death. The only cases in which such a judgment can be
valuable to the plaintiff are cases in which all or part of the
ground rent in arrears has accrued during the covenantor's life-
time, and such cases are today rare.
In the ordinary case, since the Act of June 12, i878,2 and
the decisions cited above, a ground rent suit is really d proceed-
ing in rem and not in personam, though it is technically conducted
as a proceeding in fiersonam.
It is to be hoped that the Legislature will pass an act which
will permit a plaintiff in an action of assumpsit sur ground rent
deed to sell* the premises after obtaining a judgment against the
owner alone. He should have the privilege of joining the cove-
nantor as a defendant or of not joining him, as he may desire.
In the great majority of cases he would elect not to join the
covenantor, and would therefore save time and the costs of issu-
=22 Pa. 51o (1854).
x47 Pa. 283 (1864).
"P. L 205, (Purdon's Digest, 4044).
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ing, serving and advertising the alias writ. Such a statute,
coupled with the abolition of the inquest as suggested above
would greatly simplify and expedite the present expensive, com-
plicated and tedious system of collecting ground rents by suit.
Shippen Lewis.
Philadelphia, November 6, 1r94.
